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INsuneNCE CoNsUMER CouNsEL's ColutvtN

ExcrusroNs Fon Wen ANo Tennonrsu: WHo Wrrr. Pev Fon M¡.N-M¡'oB C¡.tesTRoPHES?
nv Psorassoa CRsc Mulvno
Former presidential candidate
Ross Perot would have described it
as alatge suckrng sound, the collective gasp that insurance consumer counsel all around the United
States made when they watched
George Bush announce on TV that
the Wodd Trade Center âttacks
were "an zct of war." Â presidential
declaration of war could have the
legal import of subjecting tens of
thousands of personal and
commercial insurance claims that
would arise from the September
catastrophe to the "act-of-war

exclusions" that typically dot most
insurance policies.

The magnitude of the loss of
lives a¡rd property was surreal: The
destruction of four jetliners and the
kilhng of all their crews and passengers, the collapse of one of the
largest pieces of commercial teal
estate in the wodd and damage to
the surrounding buildings, partial
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destruction of the Pentagon, the
death of thousands of workers in
and around the buildings, the loss
of lives of hundreds of emergency
response personnel, destruction of
thousa¡rds of vehicles, and loss of
t-hat great mass of office systems,
equipment, fumiture, files, and
personal belongings that filled the
hundreds of business offices that
disappeared nto rubble and, finally,
the endless ripples of business
interruption for those companies.
This is a nation whose people,
businesses, and industries insure
against catastrophe, and it was
immediztely clear that the ability to
cope with the flrnancial loss was
gourg to involve massive insurance
cláims. In an eerie prediction of the
future, an insurance industry analyst
in 1999 had made a rough calculation of the life insurance loss if

5,500people died from

anactof

terrorism in the downtown core of a

U.S. city. Assuming a conservative
life insurance per
$100,000
^vetage
worker, the cost of life insurance
benefìts alone in such a catastrophe
would be $550,000,000.1 Rematkably, almost 5,000 people subsequently died in the September LL
attacks.
Most of those killed were
adults acting in the course and scope

of employment, which could result
in thousands of compensable
workers' compensation claims for
surviving dependents. An unknown
number of injured will file work
comp claims for medical and
disability benefits. Though there
has been no indication that workers'

compensation carriers ìntend to
deny claims from September 1,1",
legal issues may surface about
whether njuries or death as a result
of terrorism meet the requirement
that they "arise out of' the employment. Not all injuries that occut at
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the wotkplace are cornpensable.
Traditionally, the employee had to
show that the injury was caused by
an increased risk imposed by the
employment distinct from the risk
to the general public.2 Now, many
jurisdictions have adopted the

"positional risk doctrine" undet
which the causal link is made if the
"conditions and obligations of employment" place the employee in a
positron where he was injured.3
The World Trade Center had
just been leased to a real estate
investment trust under a $3.2
billion, 99 -yezr lease agreement. The
German reinsurance firm, Ffanover
Re, said the WTC was insured for
$4 billion in property damage and
$400 million for business interruption. Business loss for the
companies in the towers and arca
affected by the bombing is incalculable. Âfter the 1993 WTC
bombing, New York City offrcials
estjmated company and govemment
losses at $ó92 million per week if
the Wodd Trade Center were closed.4
Initrally, several insurance
companies cited President Bush's
declaration that the f etliner attacks
constituted "aflàct ofwar" and
ndicated an intention to invoke the
act-of-wæ exclusions common in
the policies. Cox Insurance in
Btitain, which insured part of the
Wodd Trade Center, said it might
try to reject claims on policies where
the acts of warwere specifically
excluded citing the "major impact"
the attacks would have on its profits. XL Capital Limited, another insurer with substantial risk, estimated
its potential liabilities from the atrack at $700 million but held off on
asserting its act of war exclusions.
,A.rab Insurance Group, the Arab
wodd's largest insurer based in
Bahnin, noted tersely that the act-

of-war exclusions issue "adds
another legal dimension to the in-

of this catastrophe."
However, within days, the
insurance industry was making clear
its election not to assert the war risk
surarìce aspect
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exclusions. Metropolitan Life quickly
said itwould pay $300 million in
death benefìts for survivors of the
\X/TC attacks. Chubb Corporatron
issued a flews release saying that the
act-oÊwar exclusions would not
apply. Hatford Financial Services
Group, Inc. concurred a¡rd said it had
already begun pzytrrg out claìms. The
major insurance trade organizations
ptedicted theit members would not
try to use the defense. Â spokesman
for the Amedcan Council of Life
Insurers said, "It's not an issue."
The insurers recognized three
realities that prompted their readiness to honor claims in spite of the
magnitude of the losses. First, with
the exception of aviation policies,
their policy exclusions were for "actsof-war" and not for terrorism.
Second, existing case law had
construed the war dsk clauses to
mean actions between sovereign
nations. Third, and pethaps most
importantly, the catriers recognized
rhzt any attempt to stand behind the
exclusions in the face of the intense
nattonal emotion arising out of the
attacks would be a colossal public
relations disaster. As the Director of
Insurance with the Consumer

Federation of America said,

"Itwould

be very hard for a company to do that
[assert the war exclusion] even

if

they're right."
Nevertheles s, one anaìyst
speaking on National Public Radio
thought it realistic that, out of the
public eye, reinsurers might assert the
act-of-war exclusions against the
prknary carriers. While the reinsurers
accept premiums to guatd front line
carriers against ltrwrcial catas trophes,
they apparently were not planning on
a,garîe where the stakes were so high.
Germany's Munich reinsurance estimated its liabilitres from the bombrngs
at up to $903 million, Swiss Re at
$730 million , and Zurich Financid, at
$400 million. The CEO of Carvill
America, Inc., z reinsurance broker in
Norwald, Conn., predicted that clarms
of the policyholders would be
honored but that the industry would

then engage in wrangling over

which insurers would be liable for
those claims.
It is axiomatic that if the
insurers are forced to pay enorrnous
claims as a result of the bombings,
they themselves will become
plaintiffs in subrogation claims
against economically viable sources
who they believe should have been
able to prevent the losses. As one
writer says, insurance companies
have the resources to be powerfrrl
plaintiffs.s Insurers for the defendants in the subrogation claims who
are facedwith providing defense or
indemnity of these large claims may
have more incentive and less public

relations risk in asserting war risk
exclusions of coverage.

According to the Insurance
Information Institute, the attacks
on the V7orld Trade Center in New
York on September L1, 200L, will
ultimately be the most costly manmade or nab;lrd. catastrophe in U.S.
history. The 1993 bombing of the
Wodd Trade Center caused losses
of $510 million, the Los Angeles
riots of 1992,ff775 million, and the

Oklahoma City bombing $125
million. It is also notable that the
World Trade Center bombing in
1993 resulted 1n 17 4 lawsuits
seeking àtotal of $1.9 billion.
Natural disasters such as the
Northridge Earthquake in Southern
Californiawhich caused $16 billion
in insured losses, and Hurricane
Andrew in 1992 at $15.5 billion,
pale in comparison to the
September 11 Wodd Trade Center
attack which is expected to tally
insured losses of between $30

billion and $70 billion. Montana's
Insurance Commissioner, John

Morrison, related the estimated $30
to $70 billion WTC losses to the
wodd insuralce industry's total
supply of money of $300 billion and
concluded that the cla-ims may
amount to a fifth or sixth of that
supply, a situation that will surely
cause rates to increase.6 Insurance

ratings analysts predicted that
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wars, the wat risk exclusion is most
prevalent, explicit, and nteqpreted
by courts ur maritime policies.e In
those policies, these exclusions are
called "Free of Capture and SeDure"
or "FCS" clauses.l0 Interestingly,
none of the FCS exclusions covers
piacyTr,which may be viewed more
an zct of theft than a wadike

wars and "warlike acaonby a

Consequently, all standard properlry
and liability policies, including
homeowners a¡rd auto policies,
urclude war risk exclusions. However, as a general rule, workers'
compensation coverage does not
exclude inlury due to war.7
During the Vietnamese Wat,
many life insurance policies contained war risk exclusions.s Now,
however, the American Council of
Life Insurers, the main life insurance trade groupr asserts that the
life insurers stopped using war
exclusions in their policies in the
l-970s. This is likely the reason why
insurers Lke Metropolitan Life and
Northwestern Mutual Life were able
to announce quickly that they would
pay claims knowrng that few
persons in the WTC work force
would have been old enough to
have pre-Vietfiafi era life insurance
policies.
Because insurance had its
bifth in the maritime industry and

mtlitary force," as well as insurrection, rebellion, or revolution.

because maritime shipping has
throughout history been a target in

following. Such loss or
damage is excluded rega.rdless

liability of the property carrlers
would be modest but that risk to
the workers' compensation and
business interruption insurers was

virtually unhmrted in terms of
number of claims. Life insurance,
commercial generaì liability
insurance, commercial propertY
insurance, homeowners insurance,
auto insurance, and workers' compensatron insurance will all play
maior parts in covering the losses
of September 1-1.

Prevalence of the Exclusions
The Insurance Services
Office, Inc. rn New York, ffade
orgønizaTion for the propeny/
casualty insurance mdustry, drafts
rhe forms for the industry. The ISO
forms contain broad exclusions that
the insurer will "not pay for loss or
damage caused drtectly or indirectly
by war and military action." The
exclusions include undeclared civil

0ô'$

^s
gesture.

The War Risk Exclusions
War risk exclusions genetally
bar coverage for damages resulting
frorr' "w zr, invasion, civil war,
revolution, insurrection or warlike
operations, whether there be a

declaration of war ot not."12 Most
properry insurance policies nclude
act-of-war clauses in their exclusions. The exclusion will commonly
provide as follows:
We wdl not pay for loss or
damage caused ditectly or
indirectly by any of the
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event
concurrently
or in any sequence to the loss.
***
War and Military Âction
1. Wa4includrng
undeclared or civil war;
2 Warlike actron by a
-ilit"ry force, including
action in hindering or
defending aganstan
of

atty other cause or

that cofltributes

11 are acts of war within the
meaning of the exclusions. ,A.s z
general rule, the courts have been
frnding acts of terrorism not to be
acts of war under the exclusion. For

striking
September
Pan
Amedcan Wodd Aírways, fnc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Sweqt Co.rla
from the Second Circuit. On
example, a case with
similarities to events of
11 is the !974 case of

of the covered property. Also, the
court noted that the exclusion was
ambiguous with regard to political
hijackings and that the carriers, in
light of the 200 aidine hijackings
that had occurred in the previous
ten years, (eight of which involved
Pan Âm planes), knew of the

ambi$xty but did not change it.
The court held rhata""war"
required the enga.gement

of

actual or

expected
quasi-sovereign
attack,by
nations
and that
The court held that alfuaf, required the engagement of
any gov"insurtection"
an
sovereign or quasi-sovereign nations and that an 'rinsurrectiontt
emment, must involve an intent to overthrow a lawfully constituted
regime. must involve an
sovereþ
intent to
or other
ovefthrow a
,".ttãlf
using
constituted
ry
personnel
or
September
6,1970,
the
Popular
regime.
Consequently,
it held that
-ilit
Front for the Liberation of Palestine the policies did not exclude coverage
other agents; or
3 insurrection, rebellion,
hijacked a Pan Äm jetliner departing of losses related to political hijackrevolution, usurped
,{msterdam for New York. Over
ing; that the loss was not due to
power or actron taken by
London, they diverted the plane to
destruction by military or usulped
govemmental authority
Beirut where they landed for fuel
power and was not due to war,
in hindering or defending
and took on a demolitions expert.
wadike operations, insurrection, civil
against any of these.
They flew the plane to Cairo where
commotion, or riot within the
they evacuated the passengets and
exclusion clauses of the policies.
Court Construction of the
totally destroyed the airplane by
The court found the hijackings and
Act-of-War Exclusions
explosion causing a loss of over $24
destruction of the aircnft to be for
The inventiveness of manmillion. On the same da¡ the PFLP
propagndapurposes and not for
kind in desþing violent solutions
hijacked a TWA airlinerãeparting ã,."ih-.o- o^f thä gor."*-"rrt,
to political problems requires the
Fra¡kfurt and a Swissair jet leaving
involved in ownership of the aircraft
courts to examine coordinated
Zutich,while being foiled in an
or their ailports involved with
violence to determine if it constiattempt to hijack an El Al aidiner.
departure or landing. Neither was
tutes an "act. of w^r." As one
The TWA and Swissair planes were
the PFLP a sovereþ that could
author said:l3
both flown to aJordanian airfield
engage kt a"wzt."
Hostlities between nations
and destroyed by explosives while
In lfofiday fnns, fnc. v.
and civil wars are not always
surrounded byJordanian troops.
Aetna fnsurance Co.rls (S.D.N.Y.,
conducted on a formal basis
The insurers who carried "all
1983) the insurers were trying to
have
no
and often
precise
risk" policies on the Pan Am plane
avoid paying for the loss of the
temporal or spatial boundsought to avoid coverage by reason Beirut Holiday Inn. The llotel,
aries. Despite several centuries
of the act-of-war exclusion. The
which opened n lg74,became a
of experience with war
court, in its review, compared the
focai point for factional fighting in
exclusions and the best (and
burdens of the parties pointing out
the Kandari district of West Beimt
sometimes less then the best)
that the insurers needed to prove
tn 1975 and 1976. An amaz:mgartay
drafting efforts, questions of
that the proximate cause of the loss
of political parties, front groups,
whether or not a loss is
fell within their exclusion, while the
commando groups, militia groups,
covered by a"wat exclusion"
exclusion would be given the interand other otgarrizattons caused the
are still being brought to the
pretation most beneficial to the
hotel to change hands numerous
courts for settlemeut.
insured. The court asserted that the
times in armed fighting which
msured, Pan ,\m, under the all risk
appzreniy rendered it unfit for a
The essential question is
policy, needed only to show the
Best Westem designatron and
whethet attacks such as September existence of the policies and the loss
resulted ìn a claim for its loss.
Tnrar Tnn¡{os - WINTER 2002
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The exclusion in the Holiday
Inns policy provided:
2. This insurance does

not

cover:
a.) Loss or damage caused by

any of the perils hereby
insured against, if such loss
or damage either in origin or
extent is directly or indirectly,
Ì

Ìl

ii
il

.tl

proximately or remotely,
occasioned by or contributed
to by any of the following
occurrences, or either in
origin or extent, directly or
indirectly, proximately or
remotely, arises out of or in
connection with any such
occuffences, namely:' \X/ at,
invasion, act of foreþ
enemy, hostilities or wadike
operations (whether war be
declared or not) civil war,
mutiny, insurrection,

revolution, conspirac¡
-ilitury or usulped power."
The court

n lfoliday Inn

adopted the defmition of "insur-

rection" from the Pan Am case and
held that an insurrection must be
prcplr.atory to a civil war. llowever,
the court found that the parties
were fightrng for òontrol of the
district and that none was trying to
overthrow the Lebanese government, not even the Palestinian and
Syrian forces involved.
It is agaurst this background
that the courts today would decide
whether the attacks of September
Ll were "acts-of-war." While bin
Laden's organizaion certainly
advocates the overthrow

of

govemments unfriendly to fundamentalist Muslim govemments and
even Muslim govemments that are
too moderate, his organization is
unlikely to be found to be a

"sovereþ"

so as to be engaged in a

war. Though the events of
September l,l, far exceed in death
and damages those of the Pan Am
case in l-970, the WTC attacks could
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still be viewed as undertaken for
putposes ofpropaganda and not
the overthrow of the United States.
T}ae Pan Am and lfofiday Inn
cases holding that war must occur
between sovereþs and that
insurrection must necessarily be
aimed at overthrow of the govemment likely persuaded the $(/TC
insuters not to stand on the acts-oÊ
war exclusions. Admittedly, there
are substantial cases in favor of the
insurers on this issue. In at least
seven cases, courts have enforced
the war and insurrection exclusions.16 FIowever, in each of the
seven cases, the property subject to
the exclusion was damaged during

wars or insurrections by groups
exptessly attempting to overthrow
exis

trng govemments.

17

The insured in the case of a
terrorism loss will likely not hzve a
diffrcult time meeting the burden of
showing that the loss falls within the
coverage oF the basic insuring
agreement. The property /casuùty
policies use broad insuring
^greements followed, especially in the
case of commercial general liability
policies, by a long list of exclusions.

In terrorism cases, it becomes
incumbent on the insurer to prove
that the claim falls within the war
risk exclusion. The insurer's burden
is made more difhcult because the
insurance contract is a contract of
adhesion. Consequently, courts
likely will construe an ambiguous
war risk exclusion against the
insurer and in fzvor of the insured.
Finally, zs z mztter of social policy,
coutts typically construe an insurance exclusion nartowly ìn favor

of coverage.

The Specter of Terrorism
Exclusions
With the exception of
zviarton insurance, Ame rican
insurance companies have not used
terrorism exclusions ur their
policies. It was apparentJy clear to
the insurers that the war risk

exclusions as previously interpreted
in such cases as Pan Amatd

Ifofiday Innwould not protect
them from the claims arisng from
the September L1 attacks. Nevertheless, it is equally clear that the
industry will take no chance of
suffering similar losses in the
future. FIence, they will follow the
lead of the carriers in Britaìn and
the conti-nent who use terrorism

exclusions tailored to acts of
political terrorism and hijacking
that cannot be inter-preted to
apply only to acts of sovereigns

or acts designed to overthrow
govefnmeflt.
Such terrorism exclusions

would have profound implications
for commercial insureds who want
to protect their property from the
heightened risks posed by modem
terrorism, especially risks involved

in transportation and energy. Inabilrty
to insure agzinst loss by terrorism
could stifle or err'en freeze some components of the economy. füuld one
operate trains, busses, or commercial
aircraft without coverage for losses
from terrorism? füuld agro-up build a
sþ-scraper, amusement parþ or
athletrc stadium without such coveraç? Would banks lend to build such
projects if their mo4gaçes' interesr
were not nsured against such losses?
Should the regulators, the National
Associatìon of Insurance Commis-

sioners, forbid terrorism exclusions?
Would the ndustry refuse to insure
without the exclusions?
It is easy to be critical of the

industry for refusing to cover that
a visible and rmportant risk. After all, isn't that the
pulpose of insurance? In the
insurers defense, one of the pnnciples of insurance underwriting is
that the insurer should only underwrite those losses that can be
calculated both in terms of
frequency and magnitude of loss.
State Farm actuaries can tell with
reasonable certainty how many of

which is such

their insureds will be in auto acci-
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dents and how much they

will pay

in indemnity benefits next year.
They can even predict with
acitarial reliability how many
earthquakes they will pay out on
in a given 100-year pedod. But no
insurer can predict what will
constitute next year's terrorism,
either in characte4 ftequency,
magnitude, or geographic
location. That is why providing
war risk insurance where
terrorism is likely is so expensive.
Following the invasion of Kuwait,
the war risk insurance prernium

for a single flight to the Saudi
Arabian capìtal of Ruyadh was
$1ó2,500.te Â flight to Tel Âviv

Insuring the Insurers Against
Terrorism
A strugle with economic,

Israel was $65,000, and a I(LM
stop ât Oman cost ân additional
premium of $57,700.le Such

political, social ramifications is in
progress now ovef the core question of how we should best spread
the losses from acts of terrorism.

premiums to cover terrorism
added anywhere from $L00 to
$1,000 cost per passenger. ì7orse,
the coverage term was per flight
fot avtatton and on 224-hour
basis for marine hulls.2o It was
the insurers way of saying we
can't predict or underwrite the

The industry's immediate move v/as
to ask Congress to cover 100% of
the cost of insuring terrorism. The
Bush administration countered with
a proposal that the taxpayers would
shoulder the first 80% of the cost of
terrorism leaving the rest to
indusúy. Both proposals beg the

risk.

Federal Gourts:

NruW

- U.S, Supreme Court (all states -1990+)
- th Circuit Court of Appeals (all states -1990+)
- 9th Circuit Court of Appeals, Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel

- U. S. Bankruptcy Court - Montana (1989+)
- U, S. District Courts - Montana (1987+)

State Courts/Agencies:

$$ another day in
All these databases:
unlimited usage per firm
for one low price!
No downloading or printing charges!

- Montana Supreme Court (1868+)
- Montana State District Courts (1990+)
- Administrative Rules of Montana (10/99+)
- Montana Codes Annotated/Annotations (1 989+)
- Attorney General (1957+¡
- Montana Workers' Compensation Court (1986+)
- Montana Water Court (1991+)
- Human Rights Commission (1992+)
- Montana Office of Public lnstruction (1992+)
- Public Service Commission (1985+¡
- State Tax Appeal Board (1998+)
- Child Support Enforcement Division (1993+¡
- Dept. of Labor & lndustry - Unemployment lns.,
Wage & Hour, Collective Bargaining (1999+¡
- State Bar of Montana Ethics Committee (1993+¡

Tribal Courts (Opinions and Godes):
- Fort Peck Tribal Court (1986+)
- Limited text from Blackfeet, Crow, Confederated
Salish and Kootenai Tribal and Noñhern Cheyenne
Courts

Nobody does Montana law
better than Montlaw.
Gall for a free demo!

44e-888e

or 800-81 6-0636

Tnrar TnBNos - SøTNTER 2002

ffi ffi

P. O. Box 749

Helena, Montana 59624

PecB 31

question of why govemment (read
taxpayers) should be the first payor.
Why not let govemment be the
ultìmate reinsurer and let the
insurers cover the undedying risk in
layers. The British govemment
formed'?ool Re" the "teinsurer of
last resort" which provides coverage
beyond the exclusions of the private
insurers.2l The British system
provides five layers of coverage with
the govemment covering after the
private layers are exhausted.22
It is not unusual fot govemto
act as reinsurer of wartime
merit
risks. Encou :ragngprivate marine
and aviation transport in tlme of
war requires that government take
the ultimate catastrophic risks. This
often leaves private insurers to
"cherry pick," that is to collect premiums where the losses are capPed.
F{ence, the old saying that war is
good for insurance companies.

agree to be the primary insurer for

see the plan formed in the next
few months as Congress, the

coverage for terrorist acts, which
would bring disarray to whole

of the economy. When
Florida planned to ban terrorism

areas

exclusions, the insurers made clear
their intention to refuse insurance
for Disney Wodd. Congress, on

the other hand, doesn't want to
shoulder the entire risk of terror-

ism.If Congress doesn'tblink and
terrorism exclusions become the
norm, entities in the economy

"r.rr.

negotiate.
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terrorist acts must be spread
across American society somehow.
The loss can be spread in the form
of premiums in the pool of
insureds, primartly those putchasing property, casualty, and
workers' compensation insurance.
If that happens, there will be steep
increases in premiums in some
lines as insureds are forced by
terrorism exclusions to buy
endorsements or policies that

to regíster f or the )unu^rg
see Page l* lor detaíls

insurers, and the White House

3. Id., at $ 3.05.

September 11 revealed that losses
from an act of tertorism could
rival those of acts of war and
threaten the financial viability of
the insurers that make American
enteqprise possible. The insurers
agree that they will sun'ive this
loss but will not take the chance
on another of the same or greater
magnitude. The risk of loss from

industry to see who blinks first.
Insurers are threatening to exclude

Alternativel¡ the loss can be
spread to the pool of American
taxpayers in the form of additional
taxes required to allow the government to underwrite all or a milor
part of the risk of terrorism. There
is great urgency in developing the
American structute for dealing
with terrorism losses through
insutance, and one can expect to

2. Larson, Workers Compensation Law,
$ 3.0 03.

Conclusion
The coordinated attacks on
the WTC and Pentagon on

and there is a staring contest going
on between regulators and the
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provide terrorism covetage.

the first 80% of risk, terrorism
exclusions may not appear in
American policies. So long as the
loss did not fall under the act-ofwar exclusions, coflsumers would
still be protected from loss by acts
of political terrorism.

Covering the Consumer for
Loss from Terrorism
How will the. consumer
ultrmately be protected ftom risk
of terrorism? It is too eady to tell,

þ.

whose terrodsm risk demand
protection will ultimately have to
buy insurance in the form of
waivers of the exclusion by
endorsement or by sepârate
terrorism coverage just as entities
now buy war tisk coverage. One
can guess that coverage might be
minimal, premiums expensive, and
policy terms very short. On the
other hand, if Congress were to

se

14. 505 F.2d 989.
15. 571 F.Supp. 1460.

Mchael Foran, Do I%ar&iskExclusions
No. 42 Andrews Ins.
Coveraç Litig. Rep. 935 (Sept. 21, 2001) for
collection of cases and citation".
1.6. .f¿e,

Realþ Excløde Couet"age,11,
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Nocas, al:oie, at4I.
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